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Explanations and the Preponderance Standard:  Still 
Kicking Rocks with Dr. Johnson 
Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo 
We both were friends with and deep admirers of Craig Callen.  One of 
us (Allen) knew Craig from the beginning, as it were, and co-authored a 
number of articles with him.1  For the other (Pardo), Craig was not only a 
friend but also a mentor.  He was a wonderful person, always cheerful even 
in the face of tragic adversity, humble and understated in his personal 
interactions, and an acute analyst in his scholarship, a scholarship that all too 
tragically was cut short. 
Craig’s early paper on the limits of Bayesian inference2 was 
pathbreaking, and deeply affected the work that we both do today.  He was 
an early cheerleader and critic of the precursors to the relative plausibility 
theory,3 and at a very early date he identified the issue that this present 
manuscript develops into a full-length treatment,4 which is the problem of 
evidentiary thresholds.  He was right to focus attention on this issue, as he 
also did on arguments and language in our work that were either in need of 
correction or refinement. 
We thank Michael Risinger for unearthing this work-in-progress, which 
to a considerable extent is an elaboration on his brief comment on one of our 
early articles, Kicking Rocks with Dr. Johnson, and we are grateful to once 
 
 John Henry Wigmore Professor, Northwestern University; President, International 
Association of Evidence and Forensic Science; Fellow, The Forensic Science Institute, China 
University of Political Science and Law.   
 Henry Upson Sims Professor of Law, University of Alabama School of Law.   
 1  Ronald J. Allen & Craig R. Callen, The Juridical Management of Factual Uncertainty, 
7 INT’L. J. EVID. & PROOF 1 (2003); Ronald J. Allen & Craig R. Callen, Teaching “Bloody 
Instructions”: Civil Presumptions and the Lessons of Isomorphism, 21 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 
933 (2003). 
 2  Craig R. Callen, Notes on a Grand Illusion: Some Limits on the Use of Bayesian 
Theory in Evidence Law, 57 IND. L.J. 1 (1982).  Another important strand in Callen’s 
scholarship is his illuminating work on cognitive science, speech-act theory, and hearsay.  See 
Craig R. Callen, Hearsay and Informal Reasoning, 47 VAND. L. REV. 43 (1994).   
 3  Craig R. Callen, Kicking Rocks with Dr. Johnson: A Comment on Professor Allen’s 
Theory, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 423 (1991).   
 4  Id. at 432; Craig R. Callen, Cognitive Science and the Sufficiency of “Sufficiency of 
the Evidence” Tests, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1113 (1991). 
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again have the opportunity to engage with Craig’s thoughts.5  It is 
unfortunate that his paper, which was written approximately ten years ago, 
could not have been written today with the benefits of knowing the 
developments over the last decade.  Not because those developments would 
have necessarily changed his mind on any of the issues he is addressing, but 
rather because we regret the loss of his incisive commentary on the present 
state of thought on the relevant issues.  As it stands, the Article is certainly 
right to focus on the threshold issue, but as we will briefly show, it does not 
address the present state of the literature.  However, it is a very useful vehicle 
to elaborate on certain aspects of the relative plausibility theory to show how 
the best understanding of it at least responds to if not completely resolves the 
complex set of issues that Craig raises.  It is in that spirit, with deep 
appreciation for his once more having forced us to think hard about difficult 
issues, and deep regret for not being able to get his reactions to our thoughts, 
that we present this comment. 
Our theory of juridical proof explains the process of proof in terms of 
the relative plausibility of competing explanations.6  The theory is the 
primary competitor to more robustly probabilistic explanations that conceive 
of standards of proof as probabilistic thresholds (for example, that the 
preponderance standards means proof beyond 0.5, with higher standards 
requiring higher thresholds).  The explanatory account shares the same ends 
or goals as probabilistic approaches, which have to do with various policy 
judgments about the likelihood of disputed facts and allocating the risk of 
error between the parties.7  According to the explanatory account, the law 
implements these policies through a process in which fact-finders evaluate 
the relative plausibility of explanations, rather than by trying to attach 
 
 5  Craig R. Callen, Spotting a Preponderance of the Evidence in the Wild: Inference to 
the Best Explanation and Sufficiency of the Evidence, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 1517 (2018).  
See supra note 3.   
 6  Michael S. Pardo & Ronald J. Allen, Juridical Proof and the Best Explanation, 27 
LAW & PHIL. 223 (2008).  This is the primary article that Craig discusses in his manuscript.  
Explanations and explanatory reasoning (i.e., “abduction”) provide the epistemological 
foundation to the theory first developed by Prof. Allen, which focused on the relative 
plausibility of stories.  Ronald J. Allen, Factual Ambiguity and a Theory of Evidence, 88 NW. 
U. L. REV. 604, 606 (1994); Ronald J. Allen, The Nature of Juridical Proof, 13 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 373 (1991).  We each discuss aspects of the theory in our other contributions to this 
symposium. See Ronald J. Allen, The Declining Utility of Analyzing Burdens of Persuasions, 
48 SETON HALL L. REV. 995 (2018); Michael S. Pardo, Epistemology, Psychology, and 
Standards of Proof: An Essay on Risinger’s “Surprise” Theory, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 1039 
(2018).  We present only a very brief sketch in this response.  In a forthcoming article, we 
discuss the theory in detail and respond to recent criticisms.  See Ronald J. Allen & Michael 
S. Pardo, Relative Plausibility and Its Critics (in progress)(on file with authors).   
 7  In the civil context, under the preponderance standard, these policies include the 
accuracy of outcomes and treating the parties equally with regard to the risk of error.  See 
Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991); Herman & Maclean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 
375, 391 (1983).   
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numbers to beliefs (as under most probabilistic accounts).  The two primary 
differences between our account and the more conventional probabilistic 
accounts are, first, the criteria that are central to the fact-finding process 
(explanatory vs. probabilistic), and, second, whether the proof process is 
characterized as comparative or not.  Unlike the conventional probabilistic 
accounts, the explanatory account is inherently comparative—whether an 
explanation satisfies the standard will depend on the strength of the possible 
explanations supporting each side.8  Under the “preponderance of the 
evidence” standard, fact-finders determine whether the best of the available 
explanations favors the plaintiff or the defendant.9  The best available 
explanation will favor the plaintiff if it includes all of the legal elements of 
the plaintiff’s claim; it will favor the defendant when it fails to include one 
of more elements.10 
Although, like us, Craig also rejects probabilistic approaches to 
standards of proof11, he challenges what he sees as the comparative aspect of 
our account.  Focusing on the preponderance standard, he argues that relative 
plausibility has trouble explaining some aspects of how the standard operates 
(1) at trial and (2) in the contexts of summary judgment and judgments as a 
matter of law.  In both contexts, his central point of criticism is the same: 
jurors and judges may reject a plaintiff’s explanation while simultaneously 
thinking that it is better than the defendant’s (which may be implausible or 
non-existent).12  For the reasons we clarify below, however, relative 
 
 8  In other words, under the explanatory account, the fundamental issue is whether X or 
Y is more plausible; under the probabilistic interpretation, the fundamental issue is whether 
X or not-X is more probable (with X and not-X summing to 1).  
 9  See, e.g., Anderson v. Griffin, 397 F.3d 515, 521-22 (7th Cir. 2005) (comparing 
explanations); Bammerlin v. Navistar Int’l Transp. Corp., 30 F.3d 898, 902 (7th Cir. 1994) 
(same); Yeschick v. Mineta, 675 F.3d 622, 627 (6th Cir. 2012) (same).  In the context of 
summary judgment, the Supreme Court has likewise emphasized the relative plausibility of 
explanations.  See Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. 425, 437 (2002) (“Neither the 
Court of Appeals, nor respondents, nor the dissent provides any reason to question the city’s 
theory.  In particular, they do not offer a competing theory, let alone data . . .”); Matsushita 
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).  Higher standards of proof 
accordingly require higher explanatory thresholds; parties with the burden of proof must do 
more than offer a better explanation than the alternative(s).  See Pardo & Allen, Juridical 
Proof, supra note 6; Pardo, supra note 6 (explaining the relationship between explanations 
and the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard).   
 10  This assumes the plaintiff has the burden the proof; the analysis reverses for issues 
(such as affirmative defenses) in which the defendant has the burden of proof.  An explanation 
will “include” an element if the element is a part of, or is entailed by, the explanation.  For 
example, in a negligence case, the plaintiff’s explanation must include each of the elements 
of a negligence claim under the applicable substantive law; if the better explanation fails to 
include an element (e.g., causation), then the defendant will win.   
 11  Callen, supra note 5, at 1524–32 (summarizing “the reasons for skepticism about 
mathematical models”).   
 12  Callen, supra note 5, at 1523 (arguing that having a better explanation is a “necessary” 
but not “sufficient” requirement for warranting a verdict in the plaintiff’s favor).  Callen, 
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plausibility accommodates the features that Craig discusses and explains 
how they fit into the process of proof.  We focus first on decisions by fact-
finders at trial and then discuss summary judgment and judgment as a matter 
of law. 
At trial, relative plausibility explains the decision threshold in civil 
cases under the preponderance standard as whether the best of the available 
explanations favors the plaintiff or the defendant.  Craig demurs, arguing that 
having a better explanation is necessary but not sufficient for the plaintiff to 
meet the burden of proof.13  He makes two points in support of this position.  
First, some jury instructions are not phrased in terms of comparisons, but 
rather appear to require an assessment of the plaintiff’s case and its 
negation.14  Second, jurors may employ a “default rule” and conclude that 
the plaintiff’s evidence and explanation are not “sufficiently 
comprehensive,” even though they may think the defendant’s alternative 
case is weaker.15  Craig interprets our theory to require a finding for the 
plaintiff in such cases, even though he thinks jurors may reasonably conclude 
that the plaintiff has not met the burden of proof.16 
Relative plausibility, however, can account for both of these points.  
Regarding jury instructions, it important to first clarify that there is wide 
variation on jury instructions on the preponderance standard (and other 
standards): some appear to use non-comparative language, some explicitly 
use comparative language, and others are ambiguous.17  More importantly, 
as we have discussed, even when instructions use non-comparative language 
when discussing the standard of proof, (1) fact-finders have no choice but to 
consider alternatives when assessing the likelihood of disputed facts, and (2) 
 
supra note 5 at 1520 (arguing that our theory “would require jurors to find in favor of the 
party with the burden of proof when the best explanation favored that party, even though the 
jurors considered that explanation (or the evidence that supported it) insufficient to warrant a 
verdict.”).  Callen, supra note 5, at 1520 (arguing that the standard for summary judgment 
and judgment as a matter of law “permits the court to enter judgment against the non-moving 
party for insufficiency of evidence without considering evidence and explanations in favor of 
the moving party.”).   
 13   Callen, supra note 5, at 1523, 1549–50, 1564–68.   
 14   Callen, supra note 5, at 1519–20.   
 15  Callen, supra note 5, at 1549 (arguing that, in addition to being better than those that 
favor the defendant, the plaintiff’s explanation must also be “sufficiently comprehensive to 
overcome reluctance to abandon the default rule stemming from absence of evidence or 
doubts about the quality of explanations in favor of the burden-bearing party.”). 
 16  Callen, supra note 5, at 1564 (arguing that our theory is “in conflict” with research on 
reasoning “that suggests that decision makers may validly adhere to default rules (such as 
finding in favor of the party that does not bear the burden of persuasion) when evidence is too 
thin to justify a different decision.”). 
 17  See John Leubsdorf, The Surprising History of the Preponderance Standard of Civil 
Proof, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1569, 1571-76 (2015) (surveying differences in jury instructions on 
the preponderance standard).   
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several other aspects of the process encourage the development of 
alternatives.18  The process is inherently comparative regardless of what the 
instruction on the standard of proof says—a fact confirmed by the empirical 
evidence on jury behavior.19 
Craig appears to accept that the proof process is comparative20, but he 
then raises his second point: better explanations are necessary but not 
sufficient.  Relative plausibility, however, has an answer here as well.  
Although it is certainly true that the proof process depends to a large extent 
on the parties to identify facts to prove or dispute, to gather and present 
evidence, and to formulate explanations of the evidence and events—and the 
legal system will largely defer to such choices21—nothing in our account 
requires fact-finders to limit their decision-making choices to the parties’ 
explanations.22  Similarly, nothing in our account requires parties to identify 
specific explanations on which to rely.23  As a matter of fact, they will often 
do so,24 but they may also choose to present their cases in a variety of 
 
 18  See Ronald J. Allen, The Nature of Juridical Proof: Probability as a Tool in Plausible 
Reasoning, 21 INT’L J. EVID. & PROOF 133 (2017). 
 19  See Shari Seidman Diamond, Beth Murphy & Mary R. Rose, The “Kettleful of Law” 
in Real Jury Deliberations: Successes, Failures, and Next Steps, 106 NW. L. REV. 1537, 1605 
(2012); Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision Making: The 
Story Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 519 (1991); NEIL VIDMAR & VALERIE P. HANS, AMERICAN 
JURIES: THE VERDICT 135 (2007).   
 20  Callen supra note 5, at 5 (“it is undoubtedly true that jurors, who are at least outwardly 
passive, often rely heavily on the parties’ gathering of evidence and formulation of theories, 
or explanations of the evidence. When jurors have no reason to question the adequacy of the 
evidence or of the hypotheses that the parties have constructed to explain the evidence, then 
it makes perfect sense for jurors to compare those hypotheses in the process of reaching their 
decision.”)   
 21  See, e.g., Carrillo v. Penn Nat’l Gaming, Inc., 172 F. Supp. 3d 1204, 1213 (D.N.M. 
2016) (“Plaintiffs are, of course, the masters of their litigation strategy, and may pursue 
litigation as they choose.”); United States v. Hock Chee Koo, 770 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1124 (D. 
Or. 2011) (“the government is the master of its evidence and may, ‘by deciding what [it] offers 
it to prove, . . . control what will be required to satisfy the authentication requirement.’”) 
(quoting WRIGHT & GOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 7104 (2000)). 
 22  This was first noted in Ronald J. Allen & Sarah A. Jehl, Burdens of Persuasion in Civil 
Cases: Algorithms v. Explanations, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REV. 893, 929 (2004) (“the actual 
practice of civil litigation encourages the parties to formulate alternative hypotheses, over 
which a choice is made (or from which a choice is fashioned)”); id. at 938 (“a story 
constructed in light of the parties [stories]”); id. at 938, n. 167 (“The possibility of fact finder 
creativity in determining what happened is not a problem for the relative plausibility theory, 
as what matters is story formation”). 
 23  Our account is distinct from the “story model” of juror decision-making.  Pennington 
& Hastie, supra note 19.  The latter is a psychological account of juror behavior and, unlike 
our account, it does not provide an account of standards of proof and other aspects of the proof 
process.  For discussion of the differences between the accounts, see Michael S. Pardo, The 
Nature and Purpose of Evidence Theory, 66 VAND. L. REV. 547, 598–99 (2013).   
 24  See Reid Hastie, What’s the Story? Explanations and Narratives in Civil Jury 
Decisions, in CIVIL JURIES AND CIVIL JUSTICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 23, 
31 (Brian H. Bornstein et al. eds., 2008) (“One observation, from years of study of stories at 
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alternative ways.  In other words, as we have explained, the scope of 
“explanations” in our account is much broader than Craig’s interpretation 
appears to assume.25  Parties may sometimes proceed, or defend, by offering 
disjunctive explanations, general explanations, or in some cases by invoking 
all of the possibilities that may support them without identifying a specific 
alternative.26  Thus, in the extreme examples that Craig suggests (i.e., weak 
plaintiff cases with no defense alternatives), our account allows for decisions 
by jurors to reject all of the offered explanations.  In such cases, jurors may 
formulate their own explanation of what they think most likely occurred, but 
they are not required to do that either.  They may simply conclude 
“something else must have happened” or “we have no idea what happened” 
and find against the party with the burden of proof.27  On the other hand, 
even plaintiff cases and explanations that appear weak in the abstract may 
become considerably more plausible when compared with the alternative 
possibilities and, thus, fact-finders may accordingly find for plaintiffs in such 
cases.28  Relative plausibility accommodates each of these possibilities and 
the various points that Craig raises about proof at trial. 
Craig also focuses on “sufficiency of evidence” in the context of 
summary judgments and judgments as a matter of law.29  The standard in 
each of these contexts is the same: whether, construing the evidence and 
drawing reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor, a reasonable jury 
could find for the plaintiff by a preponderance of the evidence.30  Craig 
 
trial, is that the defense perspective is more complicated and usually involves at least two 
stories: the story of the defendant’s activities and a second story to account for the events that 
led to the lawsuit.”); THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS, 
POWERFUL WORDS:  STORYTELLING & PERSUASION TECHNIQUES FOR COMMUNICATING YOUR 
THEORY OF THE DEFENSE (2016). 
 25  See Michael S. Pardo, Group Agency and Legal Proof; Or, Why the Jury is an “It,” 
56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1793, 1839–51 (2015) (discussing different types of explanations); 
Pardo, supra note 23. 
 26  See Pardo, supra note 25.   
 27  Pardo & Allen, supra note 6, at 238 (“If the proffered explanations truly are equally 
bad . . . judgment will (and should) go against the party with the burden of persuasion.”).  In 
some of the early papers first beginning the exploration of alternatives to probabilistic 
reasoning, Prof. Allen presented the nature of juridical proof as a choice between what the 
parties advanced.  See Allen, supra note 6, at 409.  But even at the early date it was recognized 
that a verdict could be for a defendant even when the defendant had presented no evidence “if 
the fact finder concludes that any story told by the defendant would be more plausible than 
the plaintiff’s.”  See Allen, supra note 6, at 412.   
 28  See, e.g., Bammerlin, 30 F.3d at 902 (“[Plaintiff] proceeded by eliminating the 
alternatives . . .  [Plaintiff] produced evidence that could lead a rational jury to eliminate the 
hypotheses inconsistent with his favored theory, which in turn permits an inference that his 
hypothesis is true.”).  See also Anderson, 397 F.3d at 521 (“[I]f in a particular case all the 
alternatives are ruled out, we can be confident that the case presents one of those instances in 
which [a] rare event did occur.”)   
 29  FED. R. CIV. P. 56, 50. 
 30  See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 
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contends that our account has trouble explaining this standard because (1) 
defendants moving for summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law 
need not offer any counter evidence or alternative explanations, and (2) he 
interprets our account to require that defendants do so.31  As we have 
clarified in subsequent work, however, our account does not require 
defendants to provide either evidence or explanations, and relative 
plausibility explains the standard in a straightforward manner.32  To say that 
no reasonable jury could find for the plaintiff (by a preponderance) is to say 
that no reasonable jury, construing the evidence and drawing reasonable 
inferences in favor of the plaintiff, could find the plaintiff’s explanation to 
be the best available explanation.33  This may be the case because the 
plaintiff’s explanation is implausible (regardless of the contrary 
possibilities), or it may be the case that no reasonable jury could find for the 
plaintiff because, based on the plaintiff’s evidence, there is an obvious, 
alternative explanation that is just as good or better than the plaintiff’s.34  In 
neither case is the defendant required to proffer evidence, and courts may 
 
477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986) (explaining that summary judgment depends on whether 
“reasonable jurors could find by a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff is entitled 
to a verdict”); Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000) (explaining 
that the standard for judgment as a matter of law “mirrors” the summary-judgment standard).  
This assumes that the plaintiff has the burden of proof on the issue and that the preponderance 
standard applies.  When the defendant has the burden on the issue, then the issue is whether a 
reasonable jury could find for the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence.  Parties with 
the burden may also move for summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law—in such 
cases, the standard is whether a reasonable jury must find for the moving party.  Reeves, 530 
U.S. at 150.   
 31  Callen, supra note 5, at 44 (“If the standard of proof asked whether the plaintiff’s story 
was better than the defendant’s, then Celotex would require the defendant to offer some 
affirmative evidence”).  See also id. at 40 (“Directed verdicts and summary judgments are 
two of the procedural means by which courts decide that a party’s evidence is simply not good 
enough”).   
 32  See Michael S. Pardo, Pleadings, Proof, and Judgment: A Unified Theory of Civil 
Litigation, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1451 (2010) (discussing the standards for summary judgment and 
judgment as a matter of law in explanatory terms).  And again even the early work on relative 
plausibility noted the creative role of the fact finder.  See supra notes 22, 27.   
 33  See Pardo, supra note 24, at 1484–85.   
 34  See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587–88 (concluding the plaintiff’s evidence was 
insufficient to survive summary judgment because (1) the plaintiff’s theory was “implausible” 
and “made no economic sense,” and (2) plaintiff’s evidence was more likely explained by 
independent conduct (which would not give rise to liability)).  See also Eastman Kodak Co. 
v. Image Tech. Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 468–69 (1992).  Similar considerations apply in the 
pleading context.  See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 567–68 (2007) (concluding 
the plaintiff’s explanation was not plausible because “here we have an obvious alternative 
explanation”); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 681 (2009) (concluding that the plaintiff’s 
explanation was not plausible “given more likely explanations” including an “obvious 
alternative”).  See also Pardo, supra note 31, at 1483–84; Ronald J. Allen & Alan E. Guy, 
Conley as a Special Case of Twombly and Iqbal: Exploring the Intersection of Evidence and 
Procedure and the Nature of Rules, 115 PENN ST. L. REV. 1 (2010).   
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consider alternative explanations whether or not defendants advance them. 
The two employment-discrimination cases that Craig discusses, St. 
Mary’s and Reeves, illustrate the points we have made above.35  Rather than 
presenting counterexamples, they in fact fit with, and are explained by, 
relative plausibility.  These cases provide excellent examples because they 
each involve both fact-finding at trial and motions for judgments as a matter 
of law (one by the plaintiff and one by the defendant).36 
In St. Mary’s, the plaintiff alleged that he was discharged from his job 
as a correctional officer because of his race.37  At trial, the plaintiff 
established a prima facie case of discrimination, and then the defendant 
offered an alternative, non-discriminatory reason for firing the plaintiff: rules 
violations.38  During a bench trial, the court concluded that the defendant’s 
stated reason for firing the plaintiff was not the real reason, but nevertheless 
found that the plaintiff failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the plaintiff was discharged because of his race.39  The plaintiff argued 
before the United States Supreme Court that when the fact-finder rejects the 
defendant’s stated explanation for its actions (as was the case here), the 
plaintiff is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.  The Court disagreed, 
holding that a prima facie case of discrimination plus rejecting the 
defendant’s explanation might “permit” a reasonable fact-finder to find for 
the plaintiff, but this result is not mandated as a matter of law.40  In other 
words, it is also possible, based on the specific facts and evidence, for a 
reasonable jury to reject the defendant’s explanation and also conclude that 
the plaintiff has not proven discrimination by a preponderance of the 
evidence.  This result and the analysis fit perfectly with the explanatory 
structure of relative plausibility.  In explanatory terms, a plaintiff is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law (or summary judgment) only when a 
reasonable jury must find the plaintiff’s explanation to be better than those 
that favor the defendant.  Such a result was not mandated in St. Mary’s 
because a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that the defendant’s 
explanation is false, and yet, the plaintiff’s explanation was not better than 
those that favor the defendant, such as discharge for a reason other than race 
or as was the case in St. Mary’s, rules violations.41  Fact-finders are free to 
 
 35  Callen, supra note 5, at 42–45.  St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993); 
Reeves v. Sanderson, 530 U.S. 133 (2000).   
 36  These cases are discussed in more detail in Pardo, supra note 32, at 1505–08.   
 37  509 U.S. at 504–05. 
 38  The defendant conceded that the plaintiff had established a prima facie case under the 
framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800–07 (1973).  
St. Mary’s, 509 U.S. at 506. 
 39  Id. at 508.   
 40  Id. at 511.   
 41  See id. at 509–11.   
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reject the explanations offered by both sides, and that appears to be what the 
fact-finder did in this case.42 
Similar considerations apply to Reeves.  The plaintiff alleged that he 
was discharged from his job as a supervisor at a manufacturing plant because 
of his age.43  At trial, a jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff.44  The 
defendant argued that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because 
the plaintiff’s prima facie case, plus evidence discrediting the defendant’s 
alternative explanation, was an insufficient basis for a reasonable jury to find 
discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence.45  The United States 
Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s argument, because, as the Court 
pointed out, it will always depend of the details of the case.  The evidence 
sufficient to establish a prima facie case may, in fact, be quite persuasive, 
even if only put initially to this preliminary use, and when coupled with 
discrediting the defendant’s explanation, the entire evidentiary package 
could easily lead to a reasonable conclusion of liability.46  As with St. 
Mary’s, the result and the analysis fit with relative plausibility: in accepting 
the plaintiff’s prima facie case and rejecting the defendant’s explanation, a 
reasonable jury could find age to be the best available explanation for the 
discharge. 
To end where we began, we are indebted to Craig Callen and his 
memory in more ways than we can articulate.  Were he still with us, he would 
undoubtedly be now preparing to explain, once again, where we have erred, 
but, unlike most of us, without a hint of exasperation as to why he had not 
been fully understood.  He would just patiently try again to make his points 
clear, and indeed would probably not only suggest but believe (wrongly as it 
usually turned out) that the fault lie with him rather than his interlocutors.  
We are also indebted to Michael Risinger for resurrecting Craig’s 
manuscript.  It is hard to imagine a more fitting way to bring to a close a 
symposium dedicated to the achievements of one important scholar than by 
reminding us of those of another. 
 
 
 42  As Callen acknowledges. See Callen, supra note 5, at 43 (“St. Mary’s seems to be a 
good example of a case in which a fact finder worked out a story on his own”).   
 43  St. Mary’s, 530 U.S. at 137–38.   
 44  Id. at 139.   
 45  Id. at 137.   
 46  Id. at 151–53.   
